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Introduction
One of the main functions of international tax law is determining how to
allocate rights to tax international income among states. The distribution of
origin-based approaches. Origin-based allocation purports that states
should be entitled to tax income generated in their territories or arising
from the resources they control. A variety of theoretical approaches entails
the allocation of taxing rights according to the origin of income, such as the
the economic allegiance theory and, more recently, the idea of allocating
income according to value creation. These theories ultimately imply that
taxing rights must align with the location of the factors contributing to the
generation of income.
Recent developments in the international tax scene suggest a reexamination of the normative underpinnings of the current distribution of
the international tax base. The global changes arising from the digitalization
of the economy have motivated countries to reconsider the allocation of
taxing rights. Furthermore, the challenges to determine where income

is created have spurred skepticism about the suitability of origin-based
theories to justify the allocation of taxing rights.
This article argues that origin-based approaches still hold valid as
theories overestimate the feasibility of determining the origin of income
and take for granted some of the complexities resulting from economic
supply and demand chains that span across multiple sectors and countries.
Accurately pinpointing the factors that gave rise to a given income, and
the strong disagreement between countries about which economic
factors should determine the allocation of taxing rights has recently led
to a greater consideration of distributional consequences. Tax policy
discussions on how to allocate taxing rights increasingly rely on impact
assessments, suggesting a continued move from an origin-based toward
a consequentialist approach. The increasing role of the distributional
that go beyond an origin-based rationale and include distributive justice
considerations.
An alternative normative approach, which can be called the
states promotes global distributive justice. From this perspective, taxing
right allocation should aim to address the existing economic inequalities
between countries. The article’s main argument is that the diminished
scope of, and continued departure from, origin-based approaches give rise
to a normative claim that the disputed portion of the international tax base
their development needs.
The remainder of the article proceeds as follows. Part I explains the
normative foundations of origin-based theories, which still predominate in
international tax circles, and discusses some of their practical limitations.
with origin-based approaches. Part III presents the implications of this
alternative normative standard, particularly in proposals that incorporate
I.

Origin-based approaches

1. Entitlement theories and the principle of origin
A variety of theories attempt to explain the existing rules for entitling
countries to tax a given income. They can be broadly categorized as originbased theories because they generally align tax entitlement with the location

of the factors that have contributed to the generation of income. Perhaps
one of the clearest and most long-standing explanations for the current
international allocation of taxing rights is the
It was notably advanced in the 1920s by four economists commissioned
by the League of Nations to evaluate the then-current international tax
system.1 Their report is widely considered to have formed the basis of the
present international tax rules.2 The economic allegiance theory submits
that income should be allocated among countries according to “the origin
of the income or the place where the earnings are created.”3 This came
4
to be known as the
The underlying rationale is that
the states where their income is produced, possessed and disposed of.5 As
access from these states, they build a connection that implies a duty to pay
taxes.6
Alternative explanatory theories build on similar normative reasoning.
The
requires the allocation of taxing rights according to
7

1.
Bruins et al, Report on Double Taxation, submitted to the Financial Committee, League of
Nations, Geneva, 1923, League of Nations Doc EFS 73 [1923 Report].
2.
See Michael J Graetz, “Taxing International Income: Inadequate Principles, Outdated Concepts,
and Unsatisfactory Policies” (2001) 26:4 Brook J Int’l L 1357 at 1358.
3.
1923 Report, supra note 1 at 24. For an overview, see RSJ Martha, The Jurisdiction to Tax in
International Law (Deventer: Kluwer Law and Taxation, 1989) at 23-41.
4.
See Eric CCM Kemmeren, Principle of Origin in Tax Conventions: A Rethinking of Models
(Dongen, The Netherlands: Pijnenburg, 2001).
5.
See 1923 Report, supra
up to the point when the physical production has reached a complete economic destination and can be
acquired as wealth,” possession of wealth as the “range of functions relating to establishing the title to
the wealth and preserving it [which takes place] between the actual fruition of production into wealth
and the disposing of it in consumption” and disposition of wealth as “the stage when the wealth has
waste it, or re-invest it; but the exercise of his will to do any of these things resides with him and there
his ability to pay taxes is apparent” at 22-23). See also Klaus Vogel, “Worldwide vs. Source Taxation
of Income—A Review and Re-evaluation of Arguments (Part I)” (1988) 16:8-9 Intertax 216 at 223228 (explaining that the origin of income “refers to a state that in some way or other is connected to
the production of the income in question, to the state where value is added to a good”).
6.
1923 Report, supra note 1 at 18. See also Klaus Vogel, “Worldwide vs. Source Taxation of
Income—A Review and Re-Evaluation of Arguments (Part III)” (1988) 16:11 Intertax 393 at 398
(pointing out that a taxpayer integrated in the economic life of a state owes a certain degree of
that contributed to the earning of the income).
7.
Richard A Musgrave & Peggy B Musgrave, “Inter-Nation Equity” in Richard M Bird & John G
Head, eds,
of Toronto Press, 1972) 63 at 71-72.

contract between the taxpayer and the country imposing the tax.8 The costs
takes the perspective of the state and aligns tax entitlement with the
from these services.9
two variants of the
, which premises on the economic
rationale that states and taxpayers exchange services and tax payments.10
The
including not only services provided by the government but also other
factors (such as access to markets and productive resources) that contribute
to the creation of income.11 The
, commonly known as the
, is also considered a more comprehensive substitute
12
According to the faculty theory, in addition to
the allocation of taxing rights should consider the costs incurred by
the government to allow for the consumption of that income.13 A more
recent attempt to explain the alignment of taxing rights with the place of
economic activity is the
It has been advanced in
international tax circles as a basis for aligning taxing rights with where
economic activities leading to the creation of income are performed.14 The
value creation theory is considered to expand the scope of the existing
criteria for distributing the international tax base to include the location of
consumers and users of goods and services, premised on the idea that they
contribute to the creation of income.15
8.
Nancy H Kaufman, “Fairness and the Taxation of International Income” (1998) 29 Law &
Pol’y Intl Bus 145 at 184; Reuven S Avi-Yonah, “All of a Piece Throughout: The Four Ages of U.S.
International Taxation” (2005) 25:2 Va Tax Rev 313 at 315. Adopting a similar view, some have
argued for a principle of membership, according to which “individuals and companies should be
(Peter Dietsch & Thomas Rixen, “Tax Competition and Global Background Justice” (2014) 22:2 J Pol
Phil 150 at 157-158).
9.
1923 Report, supra note 1 at 18.
10. Richard Abel Musgrave, “The Voluntary Exchange Theory of Public Economy” (1939) 53:2 QJ
Econ 213 at 214-215.
11. Thomas Rixen,
(Basingstoke: Palgrave
Macmillan, 2008) at 59.
12. See e.g. 1923 Report, supra note 1 at 18; Edwin RA Seligman, “The Theory of Progressive
Taxation” (1893) 8:2 Pol Sci Q 220; Kaufman, supra note 8 at 184; J Clifton Fleming Jr, Robert J
Peroni & Stephen E Shay, “Fairness in International Taxation: The Ability-to-Pay Case for Taxing
Worldwide Income” (2001) 5 Fla Tax Rev 299.
13. 1923 Report, supra note 1 at 18.
14. OECD,
(Paris: OECD, 2015).
15. See e.g. Itai Grinberg, “User Participation in Value Creation” (2018) 2018:4 Brit Tax Rev
407. But see Johannes Becker & Joachim Englisch, “Taxing Where Value Is Created: What’s ‘User
Involvement’ Got to Do with It?” (2019) 47:2 Intertax 161. For critical remarks on how the principle

These theories have been used in tax scholarship to explain two
main principles for how to allocate tax entitlement. The source principle
recognizes the entitlement of a state to tax all income arising within its
it provides to the economic factors that contribute to the generation of
income, such as services, infrastructure, natural resources, educated or
low-cost labour, and access to market.16 The residence principle entitles
the state where an individual or corporation resides to tax its worldwide
income. Residents are held to owe taxes as a return for the rights and
their productive factors prior to foreign investment.17
Although there is no clear consensus as to which theory provides
the most adequate normative basis for taxing right allocation, what these
theories hold in common is that they all rely on some variant of the
principle of origin, that is, the broad notion that the location of the factors
that contributed to the creation of income should determine which state is
entitled to tax it.
2. Normative basis
Sovereignty requires states to respect the independence and autonomy of
other states and recognize their territorial integrity.18 The sovereignty of a
international society of states.19 States are thus entitled to the productive
factors within their territories.20

of value creation is generally interpreted, see David Quentin, “Corporate Tax Reform and ‘Value
Creation’: Towards Unfettered Diagonal Re-allocation across the Global Inequality Chain” (2017)
7 Acc Econ & L 1; Allison Christians & Laurens van Apeldoorn, “Taxing Income Where Value is
Created” (2018) 22:1 Fla Tax Rev 1; Michael P Devereux & John Vella, “Value Creation as the
Fundamental Principle of the International Corporate Tax System” (2018) European Tax Policy Forum
Working Paper, online: <ssrn.com/abstract=3275759> [perma.cc/QWC4-NJ5L].
16. Peggy B Musgrave, “Combining Fiscal Sovereignty and Coordination: National Taxation in a
The New Public Finance: Responding to
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006) 167 at 172 [Musgrave, “Combining”].
17. Ibid at 168-169.
18. Territorial integrity is generally regarded as a foundational principle of international law given
the major role of territorial disputes in enduring interstate rivalries and war. See Mark W Zacher, “The
Territorial Integrity Norm: International Boundaries and the Use of Force” (2001) 55:2 Int’l Org 215.
See also JL Brierly, “Règles générales du droit de la paix” (1936) 58 Recueil des Cours 1 (pointing
to the fundamental relationship between jurisdiction and state territory). For a broader discussion, see
Cedric Ryngaert, Jurisdiction in International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008).
19. Frederick A Mann, “The Doctrine of Jurisdiction in International Law” (1964) 111 Recueil des
Cours 1.
20. Laurens van Apeldoorn, “International Tax Co-operation in an Unjust World: Do States Have an
Entitlement to Tax Income Arising in Their Territory?” (2019) 4 British Tax Review 528 at 530.

The source and the residence principles of international tax law are
deeply rooted in the two fundamental cornerstones of international law,
territoriality and nationality, respectively. Territoriality establishes that
a state has jurisdiction over events, persons or things in its territory,
including cross-border events that are only partially in its territory
21
Nationality
establishes a connection based on the relationship between an individual
and a sovereign and extends state authority over events taking place beyond
international law) and residence (in international tax law) derive from
the same normative rationale, namely the personal, rather than territorial,
connections between a state and an individual as a source of authority.22
Sovereignty, thus, generally implies that states should be entitled
to the wealth generated in their territories or arising from the resources
they control. From this perspective, establishing tax entitlements entails
determining the causal relationship between economic factors and the
income arising from these factors. According to origin-based approaches,
this relationship between the entitlement to a given income and the origin
of that income is the fundamental standard for distributing the international
tax base.
3. Limitations
Two circumstances limit the scope of origin-based approaches as
to determine where the income was generated (which generally requires
considering every factor without which such income would not have
come to exist)23 and establish how much each factor has contributed to

21. Alex Mills, “Rethinking Jurisdiction in International Law” (2014) 84:1 Brit YB Intl L 187 at
194-196.
22. See DW Bowett, “Jurisdiction: Changing Patterns of Authority over Activities and Resources”
(1982) 53:1 Brit YB Intl L 1 at 8-9 (noting that the resident’s links with a state are as close as those
of a national for the purposes of particular areas of regulation, such as taxation, currency and military
service obligations). One reason why residence usually substitutes for nationality in tax law is the
prevalence in tax law of economic allegiance over political attachments (see 1923 Report, supra note
1 at 20). Another reason is that adopting nationality would encourage individuals to abandon their
citizenship in exchange for another in a low-tax jurisdiction (see Reuven S Avi-Yonah, “International
Tax as International Law” (2004) 57:4 Tax L Rev 483 at 485-486).
23. The origin of income should include any and all antecedents, active or passive, which were
factors actually involved in producing the consequence (generation of income). This approach is
usually called the “but for” test, or conditio sine qua non, and has long been investigated in the legal
scholarship on causation in tort law. For an overview, see Richard W Wright, “Causation in Tort Law”
(1985) 73:6 Cal L Rev 1735.

the creation of such income.24 Determining these factors in a globalized,
multinational scenario is complicated and often infeasible. A great part of
chains that span across multiple sectors and countries. Some of the
income generated in global chains derives precisely from the reduction
in costs associated with sharing of resources across business activities
throughout the chain. The contribution of the concurrent factors that lead
25

Intangibles pose a similar problem because they lack physical location and
26

Whenever origin-based entitlement theories fail to accurately determine
the location and degree of contribution of the factors that give rise to a
given income, a decision about how to allocate taxing rights requires an
additional moral judgment to be regarded as normatively legitimate. In the
absence of clear moral criteria, such a decision will be made by either some
form of dispute resolution or political negotiation. If the former is adopted,
24. Devereux & Vella, supra note 15 at 10.
25. Seee.g. Peggy B Musgrave, “Principles for Dividing the State Corporate Tax Base” in Charles
E McLure Jr, ed,
of scale and scope, joint costs, and other factors that render an attempt at separation of activities
meaningless.”); Reuven S Avi-Yonah & Ilan Benshalom, “Formulary Apportionment—Myths and
Prospects: Promoting Better International Tax Policies by Utilizing the Misunderstood and UnderTheorized Formulary Alternative” (2011) 3:3 World Tax J 371 at 379 (noting that multinationals
advantage of economics of scope and scale, including research and development costs, transactions
supra note
16 at 176 (pointing out that with the prevalence of interconnected business operations, economic
& John Vella, “Are We Heading towards a Corporate Tax System Fit for the 21st Century?” (2014)
35:4 Fiscal Stud 449 (noting that in the context of a multinational the numerous factors that contribute
to the creation of income are often spread over a number of countries, making it impossible to pinpoint
Income” (2019) Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation Working Paper No 19/01, online:
<https://ssrn.com/abstract=3358291> [perma.cc/A4ZB-72FU] at 13 (explaining that the synergies
units or geographical locations).
26. See Mitchell A Kane, “Transfer Pricing, Integration and Synergy Intangibles: A Consensus
Approach to the Arm’s Length Standard” (2014) 6:3 World Tax J 282 at 285 (pointing out that
intangibles are impossible to locate spatially and, although often extremely valuable, appear to be
immune to accurate valuation); Jerome R Hellerstein, “Federal Income Taxation of Multinationals:
Replacement of Separate Accounting with Formulary Apportionment” (1993) 60:10 Tax Notes 1131
ignored as a factor for the purposes of allocating taxing rights); Charles E McLure Jr, “U.S. Federal
Use of Formula Apportionment to Tax Income from Intangibles” (1997) 14:10 Tax Notes Intl 859 at
868 (similarly arguing that it would be advisable to disregard intangibles in the determination of taxing

a purportedly technical solution will eventually conceal a political or moral
judgment,27 since a straightforward answer based on the stated normative
standard (namely, an origin-based approach) is, in this case, unavailable.
will eventually favour more powerful countries, compounding global
inequality.28 Both solutions are problematic for lacking a sound normative
basis.29 This realization calls for an alternative normative standard when
an origin-based approach fails to accurately allocate income among states.
A second limitation of origin-based theories arises from a continued
shift away from an origin-based approach toward distribution-based
considerations in tax policy discourse. The sharp disagreements about
which economic factors should be considered relevant for allocating taxing
rights have led to a greater consideration of distributional consequences.
Recent discussions about how to adequately allocate taxing rights
among states have increasingly relied on economic impact assessments
to determine which countries will gain and which will lose as a result
of alternative proposals.30 These discussions suggest that distributional
27.

For a discussion on the relevance of political and moral biases in legal interpretation, see e.g.

“Does Political Bias in the Judiciary Matter?: Implications of Judicial Bias Studies for Legal and
Constitutional Reform” (2008) 75:2 U Chicago L Rev 853; Jill Anderson, “Misreading like a Lawyer:
Cognitive Bias in Statutory Interpretation” (2014) 127:6 Harv L Rev 1521.
28.
international tax policy, see Ivan Ozai, “Two Accounts of International Tax Justice” (2020) 33:2 Can
more commonly observed competition for investment, the recent disagreements about how to allocate
taxing rights to deal with the challenges posed by the digitalization of the economy has unveiled the
concurrent competition for revenues, which despite largely unnoted, goes back to the work of the
League of Nations in the 1920s. See Hugh J Ault, “Tax Competition and Tax Cooperation: A Survey
and Reassessment” in Jérôme Monsenego & Jan Bjuvberg, eds, International Taxation in a Changing
(Alphen aan den Rijn: Wolters Kluwer, 2019).
29. This problem is also similar to the concept of causation in tort law. See William M Landes &
Richard A Posner, “Causation in Tort Law: An Economic Approach” (1983) 12:1 J Leg Stud 109 at
110 (doubting whether it is possible to use an autonomous concept of cause to decide legal cases and
arguing that the idea of causation is a result rather than a premise of the analysis of cause). See also
Devereux & Vella, supra note 15 at 10 (noting that the continued pursuit of origin in complex cases
poses additional hurdles for countries without substantial capacity and resources and that the use of
arbitrary measures that may proxy for origin brings into question the choice of the normative principle
30. See e.g. Christoph Spengel et al, “A Common Corporate Tax Base for Europe: An Impact
Assessment of the Draft Council Directive on a CC(C)TB” (2012) ZEW Working Paper No 12039, online: <www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/59576/1/718573498.pdf> [perma.cc/9RDS-69RV]
corporate tax base); International Monetary Fund, “Spillover in International Corporate Taxation”
(2014) IMF Policy Paper, online: <www.imf.org> (discussing how the choice of allocation rules

considerations will at least in part replace the role of the traditional originreasoning behind origin-based theories fails to provide.
II.
1.
An alternative normative approach for allocating rights between nations
31

so as carry out a universal moral objective, in particular one that aligns with
a concern about global justice.32
global inequality and propose a distribution according to countries’
characteristics such as per capita income or number of inhabitants.
been embraced in some areas of international law. In international labour

“Sharing the Corporate Tax Base: Equitable Taxing of Multinationals and the Choice of Formulary
Apportionment” (2018) 25:2 Transnat’l Corp 67 (analyzing the various distributional consequences
“An Assessment of Global Formula Apportionment” (2019) IMF Working Paper No 19/213,
online: <imf.org/en/Publications/WP/Issues/2019/10/11/An-Assessment-of-Global-FormulaApportionment-48718> [perma.cc/2K96-3ZYM] (assessing the revenue implications for individual
countries under alternative formulas under a unitary tax system); Alex Cobham, Tommaso Faccio &
Valpy FitzGerald, “Global Inequalities in Taxing Rights: An Early Evaluation of the OECD Tax Reform
Proposals” (October 2019), online: <osf.io/preprints/socarxiv/j3p48> [perma.cc/N68A-KW3S]
(discussing the revenue impacts of tax reform proposals considered by the OECD on lower-income
Reforms” OECD (13 February 2020), online: <www.oecd.org> (reporting the economic implications
expected from the reform proposals recently advanced by the OECD over low-, middle-, and highAllocation-48998> [perma.cc/LR8B-WWNL] (discussing the tax revenue impacts on investment hubs
31.
32.

Alexander Cappelen calls this the assignment approach. See Alexander W Cappelen, “The Moral

have any role in the distribution of tax rights. The assignment approach would challenge this feature of
of those who are most in need.”).

law,33 law of the sea,34 international trade law,35 international climate law,36
and international patent law,37
been explicitly used as a way to foster substantive equality among states
with varying levels of capacity.
typically comprises non-reciprocal arrangements
aimed at promoting substantive equality between countries.38 The rationale
equal treatment can secure equality only among parties at an identical
39

implementation of international norms.40
2. Normative basis
considerations. The international tax regime constitutes a strong and largely
non-voluntary economic association between countries, which raises
special associative duties—duties owed to parties with whom one stands in
a robust relationship or interaction41—one of which is the requirement that
33. Constitution of the International Labour Organization, 1 April 1919 at Article 19(3) (entered
into force 28 June 1919).
34.
, 10 December 1982, UNTS 1883-1885 at
Articles 61-62 (entered into force 16 November 1994).
35.
, 30 October 1947, 58 UNTS at Article XVIII (entered
into force 1 January 1948).
36.
, 9 May 1992, at Article 3(1).
37.
, 15 April 1994, at Articles
65(2), 65(4), 66(2), and 67.
38.
between states that imposes reciprocity of commitments by all state parties to any treaty. See Daniel
Barstow Magraw, “
Norms” (1990) 1:1 Colo J Intl Envtl L & Poly 69. For a discussion in international taxation about rules
that are nominally reciprocal but substantively asymmetrical, see Steven A Dean, “More Cooperation,
Less Uniformity: Tax Deharmonization and the Future of the International Tax Regime” (2009) 84 Tul
L Rev 125.
39. See Oscar Schachter, “The Evolving Law of International Development” (1976) 15:1 Colum J
Relations” (1999) 10:3 EJIL 549 at 550; Frank J Garcia,
mechanism to achieve wealth redistribution in the face of substantial inequalities); Eduardo Tempone,
International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014).
40. Cullet, supra note 39; Tempone, supra note 39. For a related discussion in the context of tax
competition, see Ivan Ozai, “Tax Competition and the Ethics of Burden Sharing” (2018) 42:1 Fordham
Intl LJ 61.
41. These duties are sometimes called relational duties. See Andrea Sangiovanni, “On the Relation
Between Moral and Distributive Equality” in Gillian Brock, ed, Cosmopolitanism versus Non-

international institutions do not become sources of privileges to wealthier,
more powerful participants.42 More broadly, the current level of economic
integration of nations has made the global economy a substantial presence
in the lives of all states, and economic regulation and policy decisions
The fact that rules made by a state (or by a supranational rule-making
body) are consequential to other states raises the need for some degree of
coordination and equity beyond the national level.43
3. Application
distributional outcomes. The latter aims to reduce international inequalities
by allocating greater rights to lower-income states, whereas the former
tends to maintain or increase the existing inequalities. The question
about which of these normative approaches should apply to taxing right
allocation leads to the more fundamental question about whether principles
of distributive justice should be constrained to the domestic realm or
extend to the international domain.44 Within the spectrum of the various
normative accounts of global justice, this article takes an intermediary
stance that recognizes the existence of some duties of distributive justice

Cosmopolitanism: Critiques, Defenses, Reconceptualizations (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2013) 55 [Brock, “Cosmopolitanism”].
42. Darrel Moellendorf, “Cosmopolitanism and Compatriot Duties” (2011) 94:4 Monist 535. See
also Brock, “Cosmopolitanism,” supra note 41, 222.
43. Joshua Cohen & Charles Sabel, “Extra Rempublicam Nulla Justitia?” (2006) 34:2 Phil & Pub
44. This discussion is generally referred to as the problem of global justice. On one end stands global
cosmopolitanism, which argues that normative requirements of distributive justice should apply at the
global level. Cosmopolitan theorists generally share the belief that human beings—and not families,
cultures, or nations—are the ultimate units of moral concerns and thereby should be treated equally
regardless of nationality or citizenship. On the other end stands statism, which typically claims that
no duty of egalitarian distributive justice exists outside the state. Statists usually accept that we have
universal duties to humanitarian assistance to those in desperate need, but these duties are limited and
not grounded on principles of distributive justice. Early works embracing global cosmopolitanism are
Charles Beitz,
(Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1973) and Thomas W Pogge, Realizing Rawls (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989). More recent
theories of global cosmopolitanism include Darrel Moellendorf, Cosmopolitan Justice (Boulder, CO:
Westview Press, 2002); Kok-Chor Tan,
Patriotism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004); Simon Caney,
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005). One important representative
Frequently deemed as representatives of a moderate statist view include Michael Blake, “Distributive
of Peoples, Social Cooperation, Human Rights, and Distributive Justice” (2006) 23:1 Soc Phil &
Pol’y 29. For a discussion about the statist view applied to international tax policy, see Laurens van
Apeldoorn, “A Sceptic’s Guide to Justice in International Tax Policy” (2019) 32:2 Can JL & Jur 499.

to those applied domestically.45
Applied to the problem of allocating taxing rights between states, this
middle ground position on global justice entails a normative compromise
between an origin-based approach (which is premised on state sovereignty)
justice). The fundamental question is how to reconcile these two normative
approaches.
This article does not provide a full answer to this question, but it
origin-based approach fails to serve as a normative guide for distributing
the international tax base. This may happen when one of the two cases
warranted in cases in which it is impossible to accurately pinpoint the
factors that contributed to the creation of a given income and, more
importantly, the degree of contribution of each of these factors. Whenever
will be arbitrary from a moral standpoint unless it is based on some other
normative criterion for allocating taxing rights, priority should be given
to a solution that promotes, rather than departs from, distributive justice.
gives priority to distributional considerations over a clear origin-based
rationale. When the decision about how to allocate taxing rights depends
by an origin-based principle, such decision will be normatively arbitrary
in the absence of alternative normative criteria. Once again, this gives rise
on distributional consequences requires a normative rationale that takes
distributive justice into consideration. If the criteria for allocating taxing

45. It is mostly aligned with what Laura Valentini has called the “third wave” of global justice, which
provides “a sustained critical discussion of cosmopolitanism and statism, and a fresh perspective
helping us to steer a middle course between them” (Laura Valentini,
A Normative Framework (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011) at 3-4. According to Valentini,
two representatives of this position are Gillian Brock,
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009) and David Miller,
Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007). Yet, as she notes, these authors explicitly place
themselves respectively in the cosmopolitan and statist traditions. See also Jon Mandle,
Cosmopolis” (2012) 3:4 Global Pol’y 443; Mathias Risse,
University Press, 2012).

(Princeton: Princeton

countries, the underlying normative principle for this allocation must more
broadly consider whether the resulting distribution will improve or worsen
the relative welfare across these countries.
III. Practical implications
based approaches fail to serve as a normative guide, the next logical step
to trigger the former. This determination requires settling the degree of
failure of the origin-based approach with which we can come to terms.
On one end of the spectrum, one could tolerate an absolute degree of
failure and take the existing proxies for origin of income as acceptable
from a normative standpoint. This is the view implicitly adopted, for
example, by those who consider that the current allocation of taxing rights
the more complex it is to determine the underlying factors of income
generation, the more inaccurate origin-based approaches are in establishing
proxies for origin of income. Similarly, the more reliant the decision about
taxing rights allocation is on political and distributional considerations,
the less aligned such proxies are to the origin-based rationale. It follows
that these proxies become increasingly arbitrary. On the opposite end,
one could be as strict as to conclude that any origin-based approach will
be arbitrary to some degree as to require its replacement altogether for
another normative approach.46 The main problem with this stance is that
it fails to acknowledge the normative validity of origin-based theories and
to stand, however, somewhere in the middle of these two extremes, it is

in cases where the failure of origin-based criteria is most evident. The
those cases and what it would entail.
1.
In recent years, many scholars have called for a departure from separate
accounting under the arm’s-length principle toward a unitary taxation
46.

This case is made, for example, in Adam Kern, “Illusions of Justice in International Taxation”

earned by multinational corporations are allocated among jurisdictions.
A unitary taxation system under formulary apportionment would allocate
economic factors. The shift toward unitary taxation is generally touted as
a way to eliminate the complexity of transfer pricing rules and associated
administrative and compliance costs, as well as to reduce economic
distortions caused by the current system and incentives for tax avoidance
practices.47
One important and challenging aspect of adopting a unitary tax
are allocated among jurisdictions. Proposals for formulary apportionment
frequently take an origin-based approach and suggest a multi-factor
formula based on a combination of the economic factors that contributed
these factors.48 Similarly, jurisdictions that adopt formulary apportionment
in intra-state allocation of income use a variety of formulas. The United
States and Canada provide prominent examples. These two countries adopt
provinces. The experience from these countries points to a considerable
arbitrariness from a normative standpoint in how formulas and weights
are chosen. Canadian provinces have adopted a formula that weights
equally on payroll and gross receipts.49
have gradually shifted to sales as the main allocating factor, not because of

47.
Allocation” (2002) 50:3 Can Tax J 823; Walter Hellerstein, “Income Allocation in the Twenty-First
Century: The End of Transfer Pricing? The Case for Formulary Apportionment” (2005) 12:3 Int’l
Transfer Pricing J 103; Susan C Morse, “Revisiting Global Formulary Apportionment” (2010) 29:4 Va
Tax Rev 593; Reuven S Avi-Yonah, Kimberly A Clausing & Michael C Durst, “Allocating Business
48.
Principle and Formulary Apportionment Revisited from a Theoretical and a Practical Perspective” in
Wolfgang Schön & Kai A Konrad, eds, Fundamentals of International Transfer Pricing in Law and
Economics (Heidelberg: Springer, 2012) 267 at 273-276.
49. See Joann Martens Weiner, “Formulary Apportionment and Group Taxation in the European
Union: Insights from the United States and Canada” (2005) Directorate-General for Taxation and
Customs Union Taxation Paper No 8/2005, online (pdf): <ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/sites/

its normative appeal but to reduce the incentives for corporations to move
jobs and property out of state.50
arbitrary from a normative point of view, given the impossibility of
determining the degree to which each factor contributes to the generation
51
Yet, the formula ultimately chosen for
countries.52 It is thus unsurprising that impact assessment studies, however
limited they may be, given data constraints, have grown in importance in
tax policy discussions about whether to adopt unitary taxation and how to
determine the appropriate formula.53
the tax policy decision-making) give rise to the normative priority of the
of the international tax base improve rather than worsen global inequality.
It requires that one or more international development indicators be
included as a contributing factor to the apportionment formula. Including
a direct measure of international inequality in the formula is perhaps the
50. See Michael Mazerov, “The Single-Sales-Factor Formula: A Boon to Economic Development
or a Costly Giveaway?” (2001) 20 State Tax Notes 1775 (noting the weak economic rationale behind
the shift toward a single-sales-factor formula); Jack Mintz, “Europe Slowly Lurches to a Common
Consolidated Corporate Tax Base: Issues at Stake” in Wolfgang Schön, Ulrich Schreiber & Christoph
Spengel, eds,
(Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer,
2008). For some legal implications of a sales-based formula at the international level, see Charles
E McLure Jr & Walter Hellerstein, “Does Sales-Only Apportionment of Corporate Income Violate
International Trade Rules?” (2002) 27 Tax Notes Int’l 1315. The shift toward a single-sales factor is
supra note 47.
51. See Peggy B Musgrave, “Interjurisdictional Equity in Company Taxation: Principles and
Applications to the European Union” in Sijbren Cnossen, ed, Taxing Capital Income in the European
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000) (“There does not
a multijurisdictional setting” at 46); Tim Edgar, “Corporate Income Tax Coordination as a Response
to International Tax Competition and International Tax Arbitrage” (2003) 51:3 Can Tax J 1079
in any precise normative sense” at 1154); Avi-Yonah, Clausing & Durst, supra note 47 at 516-517
(acknowledging that any formula can produce arbitrary results in a given industry but arguing that
the present separate accounting system is equally or more arbitrary); James R Hines Jr, “Income
Misattribution Under Formula Apportionment” (2010) 54:1 Eur Econ Rev 108 (showing that formulas
included in proposals for formulary apportionment are not strongly correlated with determinants of
business incomes).
52. Faccio & Fitzgerald, supra note 30.
53. See e.g. International Monetary Fund, supra note 30; Alex Cobham & Simon Loretz,
Factors under Unitary Taxation” (2014) International Centre for Tax and Development Working Paper
No 27, online: <https://ssrn.com/abstract=2587839> [perma.cc/J6BW-HVUQ]; Faccio & Fitzgerald,
supra note 30.

54

concerns and brings greater transparency regarding normative rationale
and distributional outcomes.
2.
Rather than a complete overhaul of the current international tax system,
some have argued for incremental use of formulary apportionment. In this
case, formulary apportionment would only apply to the residual portion
earn for performing functions and activities on an outsourcing basis.55 Its
proponents argue that the adoption of formulary apportionment for residual
opportunities for tax avoidance and eliminating relevant compliance and
administrative costs.56
Compared to proposals for unitary taxation, the idea of a formulary
supporters of the current transfer pricing regime, mostly because transfer

generally the reduced incentives for businesses to move payroll or assets
decisions, and greater likelihood of international coordination.57
In a context where the transfer pricing regime is maintained,
approach. It also seems correct to argue that an origin-based approach
54. Although the most common approach would be to use per capita income as a reference, other
indexes may be more appropriate to measure and compare international inequality. See Anthony C
Infanti, “Internation Equity and Human Development” in Miranda Stewart & Yariv Brauner, eds, Tax
Law and Development (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2012) at 209 (arguing for expanding the focus
of inter-nation equity beyond economic growth to incorporate other non-economic considerations,
such as feminist, social or strategic, and proposing the use of other indexes which include non(HDI), the Inequality-adjusted HDI (IHDI), Gender Inequality Index (GII), and the UK Department for
International Development (DFID)). See also Kim Brooks, “Global Distributive Justice: The Potential
for a Feminist Analysis of International Tax Revenue Allocation” (2009) 21:2 CJWL 267 (arguing that
one of the implications of a feminist analysis of international tax policy is the requirement to allocate
greater taxing rights to lower-income countries).
55. See e.g. Avi-Yonah, Clausing & Durst, supra note 47; Devereux et al, supra note 25.
56. Avi-Yonah & Benshalom, supra note 25.
57. See Avi-Yonah, Clausing & Durst, supra note 25.

should account for the contribution of sales in the creation of income.
The problem, however, is that there is no clear normative basis for
allocating residual
may be a relevant contributing factor for routine
to make a direct connection between sales contribution and the generation
58

resulting from the interaction of the constituent parts of a multinational
degree of arbitrariness.59

From a political viewpoint, this might loosely appease the demands of
sales jurisdictions for greater taxing rights (see Section III.3). But from
sales jurisdictions while disfavouring countries with narrower consumer
justice perspective.
an origin-based approach could be used to determine the states to which

allocation as to its reduced susceptibility to tax avoidance and distortion
on economic decisions due to the absolute immobility of development
indexes to business decisions.
3. The OECD’s “new taxing right”
approach.”60
58.

See Devereux & Vella, supra

59. See Reuven S Avi-Yonah, “The Rise and Fall of Arm’s Length: A Study in the Evolution of U.S.
International Taxation” (1995) 15:1 Va Tax Rev 89 at 148-149.
60. OECD,
Document (Paris: OECD, 2019) [OECD,
].

61

The proposal has come as a response to demands from various countries to

the table, namely the European Union’s focus on user participation, the
US preference for considering marketing intangibles, and the Group of
Twenty-Four’s proposal for allocating income based on multinationals’
62

labelled as the “new taxing right.”63
From a normative perspective, the “new taxing right” presents a
previous section. Origin-based approaches do not provide a satisfactory
OECD’s proposal demonstrate the lack of a solid normative rationale. The
with large consumer markets, and the stated concern about potential
unilateral measures from these countries are evidence that political
64
Two
main aspects of how the new approach has been advanced also make this
clear. First, the portion attributable to market jurisdictions is not based on
any clear economic criteria but will likely be determined by an agreed65

rely on some form of political agreement rather than on a normative

61. According to the OECD, the phrase refers to the jurisdiction where customers or users are
located. See OECD,
(Paris: OECD, 2019)
at 23.
62. For a detailed discussion about the political struggles and distributional implications involving
these proposals, see Allison Christians & Tarcisio Diniz Magalhaes, “A New Global Tax Deal for the
Digital Age” (2019) 67:4 Can Tax J 1153.
63.
incremental return attributable to a jurisdiction when Amount B falls short of the market-based routine
return assumed under the application of the arm’s-length principle (Amount C). For an overview, see
the Revised Regime for Taxing Rights and Income Allocation” (2020) 97 Tax Notes Int’l 549.
64. See OECD,
, supra note 60 (explicitly acknowledging the need to achieve
a compromise solution to avoid encouraging “more jurisdictions to adopt uncoordinated unilateral
tax measures,” which “would undermine the relevance and sustainability of the international tax
framework, and would damage global investment and growth” at 4).
65. Ibid at 15.

from a normative point of view, a fairly arbitrary exercise. Second, the
unconcealed consideration of the distributional consequences of the
from an origin-based approach (which allocates taxing rights based on
a distribution-based approach (which allocates taxing rights based on the
actual distributional outcome of the possible alternatives).66 This shift
towards distributional considerations requires a re-evaluation of current
an origin-based rationale implies that origin-based principles cease to
provide normative guidance for allocating taxing rights.
In a context where distributional implications take precedence over
other considerations, principles of distributive justice become even more
relevant. Although the distributional impacts of the “new taxing right”
are still unclear, it will likely disfavour low-income countries with small
consumer markets.67
development needs.
Conclusion
The current international tax regime is generally guided by origin-based
approaches, which distribute taxing rights between states based on the
location of the factors that contribute to the creation of income. Although
satisfactory guidance for allocating taxing rights both when it is impossible
to pinpoint the factors that gave rise to a given income and when tax policy

66. The importance of impact assessments of the proposal is emphasized by the OECD and by
commentators’ analyses. See e.g. OECD, “Webcast: Update on Economic Analysis and Impact
Assessment” 13 February 2020, online: <oecd.org/tax/beps/webcast-economic-analysis-impactassessment-february-2020.htm> [perma.cc/CTS9-K7C4]; OECD, “Tax Challenges Arising from the
Digitalisation of the Economy Update on the Economic Analysis & Impact Assessment,” online (pdf):
<oecd.org/tax/beps/presentation-economic-analysis-impact-assessment-webcast-february-2020.pdf>
[perma.cc/DJP5-7C32]; Allison Christians, “OECD Digital Economy Designers: Share Your Work!”
(2020) 97 Tax Notes Int’l 1251 (noting that the information provided in February 2020 by the OECD
to these results was not made publicly available, raising questions about transparency and inclusivity).
67. See Christians & Magalhaes, supra
such as EU countries, the U.S., and middle-income countries rather than lower-income ones); Cobham,
Faccio & FitzGerald, supra note 30 (concluding that the reallocation of taxing rights deriving from
OECD’s proposal is likely to reduce revenues for several low-income countries). See also Stephanie
Soong Johnston, “Politicians Refocusing on Global Tax Reform Talks, OECD Tax Chief Says” (2020)
98 Tax Notes Int’l 955 at 956 (reporting the acknowledgment by the OECD chief tax executive that

design moves away from an origin-based rationale toward one based on
distributive considerations.
apportionment serve as a point of focus for this article. Formulary
approaches purportedly rely on an origin-based framework, but originformula that will ultimately determine how income is assigned between
countries. Moreover, recent tax policy discussions have demonstrated
a shift from an origin-based approach (which distributes taxing rights
based on economic rationale) to a distribution-based one (which gives a
greater focus to the distributional outcomes resulting from the adoption of
a reconsideration of the normative foundations for distributing the
international tax base.
Whenever origin-based theories fail as a normative guide for
allocating taxing rights, the absence of alternative normative criteria leads
allocation of rights tends to ultimately favour a few powerful countries.
normative alternative. By applying distributive justice principles, the
impact assessments and distributional implications assume increasing
importance in international tax policy discussions.

